Aryeh Kosman’s The Activity of Being is the fruit of a lifetime of work on some of the most difficult and challenging texts of ancient philosophy.

Donald Davidson established causalism, i.e. the view that reasons are causes and that action explanation is causal explanation, as the dominant view within contemporary action theory. According to his “master argument”, we must distinguish between reasons the agent merely has and reasons she has and which actually explain what she did, and the only, or at any rate the best, way to make the distinction is by saying that the reasons for which an agent acts are causes of her action. (...) “Davidson's challenge” to non‐causalists is to come up with an alternative, more convincing, way of drawing the distinction. In this paper, I argue that G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright offer such an alternative. Moreover, I argue that Davidson's own account of interpretation makes no use of his causalist claim. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that inference essentially involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion and drawing his conclusion because of this fact. However, this Taking Condition has also been criticized: If taking is interpreted as believing, it seems to lead to a vicious regress and to overintellectualize the act of inferring. In this paper, I examine and reject various attempts to salvage the Taking Condition, either by interpreting inferring as a kind of rule-following, or by finding (...) an innocuous role for the taking-belief. Finally, I propose an alternative account of taking, according to which it is not a separate belief, but rather an aspect of the attitude of believing: Believing that p implies not only taking p to be true and taking oneself to believe that p, but also taking one's reasons q to support p, when the belief in question is held on account of an inference. (shrink)

I argue for the claim that for Aristotle, the content of productive understanding primarily concerns the nature of the object a craftsperson aims to bring into existence as well as its material requirements, and only derivatively things she might do with a view to producing that object. I explain why technê is a form of understanding, by considering what it shares with and how it differs from its practical and theoretical cousins. I give four arguments for my claim. The analogy (...) of craft and nature suggests that a craftsperson understands the nature of their product and the material necessities required by the product’s existence. Further evidence comes from some of Aristotle’s remarks on the practical syllogism, from considerations concerning capacities for change in general, and from his views on why it is a two-way capacity. I end by mentioning several respects in which technê goes beyond productive understanding. (shrink)

In recent years several philosophers have proposed what has come to be called the Reasoning View of normative reasons, according to which normative reasons are premises of sound reasoning. The reasoning view has come under some criticism, which chiefly consists in counterexamples that purport to show that something can be a premise of sound reasoning without intuitively being a normative reason, or can be a normative reason without being a premise of sound reasoning. I here consider and reject three examples (...) that were recently put forward. Discussing them will allow me to clarify the Reasoning View in important respects. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 103, Issue 3, Page 586-606, November 2021.

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Inference, understood as a form of conscious and active belief-revision, has recently attracted much interest among philosophers of mind. Many writings on the topic depict inference as a kind of process. However, this assumption is, to my knowledge, nowhere explicitly justified or even reflected upon. In this paper, I argue that the assumption is wrong: while processes take time, it is not possible that inferences take time. Both claims are conceptual observations. It is therefore conceptually impossible that the mental act (...) of inferring is a process. (shrink)

I argue that realism about reasons is incompatible with the possibility of reasoning with reasons, because realists are committed to the claim that we are aware of reasons by way of ordinary belief...

In work that spans almost four decades, Michael Bratman has developed a rich account of human agency. At the centre of this account lies an understanding of intentions as individual planning states. A significant strand in this enterprise has been his work on shared agency, culminating in his 2014 monograph, which aims to extend his account of individual agency to cover cases of what he calls “modest sociality”, i.e. simple cases of acting together. Central to this endeavour is Bratman’s analysis (...) of shared intention, which for him is not a sui generis phenomenon, but can be understood in terms of his concept of individual agency, as the main components of his account of shared intention are already available in his account of the intentions of a single person. In this paper, I want to critically examine Bratman’s approach to shared intention. I will proceed as follows: In Section 1, I will describe the analytic strategy that guides Bratman’s analysis. Section 2 will introduce his central claim that the fulfilment of a list of conditions suffices for a shared intention to be present. In Sections 3 to 5, I will discuss and criticise some of these conditions. In Section 6, I will draw some positive conclusions from my critical arguments. (shrink)

I argue that realism about reasons is incompatible with the possibility of reasoning with reasons, because realists are committed to the claim that we are aware of reasons by way of ordinary beliefs, whereas a proper understanding of reasoning excludes that our awareness of reasons consists in beliefs. In the first three sections, I set forth five claims that realists standardly make, explain some assumptions I make concerning reasoning, and show why realism, so understood, cannot accommodate the truism that we (...) reason with reasons. I then consider two proposals for how to avoid the problem. (shrink)

Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving. By Marušić Berislav.

This paper offers a reevaluation of the debate between assimilationism and differentialism concerning the anthropological difference. Both sides usually assume that the difference consists in a capacity which humans possess and other animals lack, and that is added to a set of capacities humans share with other animals. A likely candidate for this role is reason. An additive conception of human reason on these lines runs into several difficulties, which can be avoided by thinking of reason transformatively, as providing human (...) capacities with a special rational form. What such a transformative conception amounts to is described in some detail for the special case of human perception. A transformative understanding of reason’s role enables us to formulate a differentialist position that does not fall prey to the usual problems of differentialism. (shrink)

In Auseinandersetzung mit Positionen der gegenwartigen Handlungstheorie argumentiert das Buch fur die These, dass absichtliche Handlungen als Konklusionen praktischer Schlusse verstanden werden sollten. Motivierende Grunde lassen sich dann als Pramissen solcher Schlusse beschreiben; normative Urteile konnen als Ausdruck einer praktischen Schlussregel aufgefasst werden; und praktisches Wissen von dem, was man gerade tut, wird als Gestalt des Bewusstseins verstandlich, das konstitutiv zu solchem Schliessen gehort.

G. E. M. Anscombe introduced the concept of »practical knowledge« into contemporary action theory. According to Anscombe, in cases where someone’s action fails to be performed successfully, the error lies in what he or she is doing and not in what he or she is thinking, wherefore his thought is not mistaken, and thus still knowledge. But Anscombe also seems to believe that knowledge is factive, i.e. to know that p implies that p. Both claims are, however, in tension with (...) each other, because my practical mistake prevents that my knowledge corresponds to a fact. This paper seeks to address the problem this tension poses for our understanding of practical knowledge. In § 1, I describe the problem. In § 2, I review Anscombe’s own response to the problem, and point out a difficulty for it. In § 3, I discuss three other attempts to deal with the problem, and argue that they are flawed. Finally, in § 4 I sketch my own solution. (shrink)

This is the first collection of essays devoted to the thought of Anselm W. Müller. It brings to the attention of the English-speaking world an influential and highly regarded philosopher who has made important contributions to a wide range of philosophical debates. The volume begins with a biographical sketch of Müller. Arguably, Müller's most important contributions are to the philosophy of action and virtue ethics. The contributors, which include friends, colleagues, and former students, engage with different aspects of Müller's thought (...) in these areas. Subjects include his interpretation of Aristotle and Wittgenstein, the teleology of thought and action, the Aristotelian distinction between poiesis and praxis and its application to ethical upbringing, and the possibility of practical knowledge and practical truth. Teleological Structures in Human Life will be of interest to researches and advanced students working on virtue ethics, philosophy of action, and practical reasoning. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to introduce and explain display calculi for a variety of logics. We provide a survey of key results concerning such calculi, though we focus mainly on the global cut elimination theorem. Propositional, first-order, and modal display calculi are considered and their properties detailed.

This article presents a didactical concept for the development of disciplinary reading strategies with A-Level-Students in high schools. The basic idea comes from cognitive and learning psychology and has been transferred to subject-teaching-contexts in recent years. For the teaching of Philosophy, the authors diagnose the existence of a missing link between the challenges of a philosophical text comprehension that focus on primary understanding on the one hand and the methods offered on the other. They argue for the development of a (...) concept of reading strategies that takes into view three levels of text comprehension that are relevant for a philosophical understanding: the conceptual-semantic-level, the logical-pragmatic-level and the text-structural-level. Following a systematic presentation of the concept and its implementation options, the authors discuss possible connecting lines between the acquisition of philosophical reading literacy in schools and in introductory seminars at universities. (shrink)

An ideal vision model accounts for behavior and neurophysiology in both naturalistic conditions and designed lab experiments. Unlike psychological theories, artificial neural networks (ANNs) actually perform visual tasks and generate testable predictions for arbitrary inputs. These advantages enable ANNs to engage the entire spectrum of the evidence. Failures of particular models drive progress in a vibrant ANN research program of human vision.

The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.

In this paper we develop a participatory model of the Christian doctrine of the atonement, according to which the atonement involves participating in the death and resurrection of Christ. In part one we argue that current models of the atonement—exemplary, penal, substitutionary and merit models—are unsatisfactory. The central problem with these models is that they assume a purely deontic conception of sin and, as a result, they fail to address sin as a relational and ontological problem. In part two (...) we argue that a participatory model of the atonement is both exegetically and philosophically plausible, and should be taken seriously within philosophical theology.i.. (shrink)

Thomas Morris and Richard Swinburne have recently defended what they call the ‘two-minds’ model of the Incarnation. This model, which I refer to as the ‘inclusion model’ or ‘inclusionism’, claims that Christ had two consciousnesses, a human and a divine consciousness, with the former consciousness contained within the latter one. I begin by exploring the motivation for, and structure of, inclusionism. I then develop a variety of objections to it: some philosophical, others theological in nature. Finally, I sketch a variant (...) of inclusionism which I call ‘restricted inclusionism’ (RI); RI can evade many, but not all, of the objections to standard inclusionism. (shrink)

The Matthean pericope of the Magi and the star of Bethlehem prompted a variety of responses among early Christian commentators of the second to the fifth centuries. These responses reflect a range of attitudes among the early Christians towards astrology, which was a fundamental and pervasive aspect of ancient Greco-Roman religion and culture. Some early Christian writers repudiated astrology absolutely, while others sought to grant it some degree of accommodation to Christian beliefs and practices. Interpretations of the (...) Matthean pericope offer an index to the range of such views. This paper examines the motifs of the Magi and of the star in Matthew 2.1-12 as well as a number of early Christian interpretations of the pericope as evidence of a pattern of ambivalence in early Christian attitudes toward Greco-Roman astrology. Résumé La péricope matthéenne sur les Mages et l’étoile de Bethléem a suscité des réactions variées chez les commentateurs chrétiens du iie au ve siècle. Ces réactions reflètent, chez les premiers chrétiens, une diversité d’attitudes envers l’astrologie, qui était un aspect fondamental et omniprésent de la religion et de la culture gréco-romaines. Certains auteurs chrétiens de l’époque répudiaient absolument l’astrologie alors que d’autres cherchaient à l’accommoder jusqu’à un certain point aux croyances et aux pratiques chrétiennes. Les interprétations de la péricope matthéenne permettent de prendre la mesure de ces opinions divergentes. Cet article examine les thèmes des Mages et de l’étoile en Matthieu 2,1-12, ainsi qu’un certain nombre d’exégèses anciennes de la péricope. Celles-ci fournissent autant d’indices de l’ambivalence de l’attitude chrétienne face à l’astrologie. (shrink)

Remembering pain - Hitting the jackpot - The bundle of life - The kingdom family - It's the economy, stupid! - Gospel economics - Ekklesia: a community of blessing - Biblical sexuality: an occasion for joy - Walking humbly with God - A humble FIRE - A humble Biblicism - A compassionate traditionalism - A committed affirmation - "May all be one" - Receiving the kingdom.

Whatever its grammatical status, the verb “to discern” has an implicit transitive element. That is to say, we always discern about something or between two options. What is the right course of action in this situation and in these circumstances? In our paper, we want to look at responses to this question from the perspective of the theology of liberation. As the name implies, this is first and foremost a theology, a way of seeking to understand and articulate the faith (...) of the believing Christian community. But it is also necessarily political, because it seeks to contribute to the liberation of those who are not free – the poor, the oppressed, those to whom injustice is done, both negatively, by decrying the presence of unfreedom and positively by working for social transformation. It is thus a public theology, a manifestation of the ongoing power of religion to inform and motivate its adherents to engage in attempts to transform the world not only in terms of a post mortem future but here and now. (shrink)

This article examines the legacy of misunderstanding and antagonism that has resulted from the history of past encounters between the Evangelical and Orthodox traditions, as a background for evaluation of more recent dialogues within the WCC and at the level of the Christian World Communions. On the basis of this, suggestions are offered regarding the parameters within which future dialogue could best be conducted. It is argued that such dialogue should be marked by integrity of methodology and realistic expectations; (...) it should be relational and spiritual in character, and open to exploring possibilities for joint co-operation. There is much to gain from such dialogue, but it will not take place unless those with a vision for it take steps to make it a reality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Beyond “Born this Way”Tim R. JohnstonLGBTQ liberation requires that we become more critical of “born this way” rhetoric—the political and quasi-scientific claims that sexual orientation and gender identity are immutable and intrinsic facts. Born this way rhetoric gets at a lot of feminist and queer theorists’ favorite questions: Are we born with a sex or a gender? Does sex inform gender, or is sex just gender masquerading as nature? (...) Do I have a gay gene that somehow got flipped on, or was I just around one too many dolls at a formative age?I’m going to make a case for moving away from this rhetoric, but before I go too much farther let me say that I am not interested in policing anyone’s language or restricting the terms we use to explain our experience. I think born this way rhetoric can and should be utilized by those who find it accurately expresses their experience, and if progressive arguments are strengthened by born this way rhetoric then I think it is fine, as a political and rhetorical strategy, to continue using it to demand respect.How can we be critical of this rhetoric while still deploying it for personal or strategic reasons? Doing so requires acknowledging that the nature/nurture debate is not likely to be resolved anytime soon, so let’s take a short cut, sidestep that debate entirely, and talk about how born this way rhetoric functions politically. After reading the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, I’ve started to think of born this way rhetoric as a kind of founding mythology. Nancy describes myth as self-inscribing, auto-articulating, totalizing discourse. A myth is complete and self-sufficient because it explains itself, and in so doing it also establishes the framework within which the myth is intelligible. For example, telling the Christian creation myth both [End Page 140] explains the creation of the world, while also setting up the ontological and theological framework necessary to legitimate that myth. Myth is totalizing because it controls what is deemed intelligible or reasonable discourse. As the Christian creation myth describes the foundation of the world, it also invalidates alternative discourses such as evolution, making the myth a closed circuit that both founds and perpetuates itself.Nancy argues that myths only exist in their telling, and telling a myth creates community: “Myth arises only from a community and for it: they engender one another, infinitely and immediately” (Nancy 1991, 50). The telling of a myth posits that myth as a foundation for the community that believes and retells the myth. Nancy says:Absolute community—myth—is not so much the total fusion of individuals, but the will of community: the desire to operate, through the power of myth, the communion that myth represents and that it represents as communion or communication of wills. Fusion ensues: myth represents multiple existences as immanent to its own unique fiction, which gathers them together and gives them their common figure in its speech and as this speech. This does not mean that community is a myth, that communitarian communion is a myth. It means that myth and myth’s force and foundation are essential to community and that there can be, therefore, no community outside of myth.(Nancy 1991, 57)It is the telling of a myth in a community that both installs the myth as foundation and creates the community of people who share in that myth. Nancy recognizes the importance of myth in the formation of community, but warns that its tendency to provide a complete and totalizing view of the world can lead to fascist thinking. Myths are not necessarily supple, and a community based on myth may not afford its members the opportunity to make sense of their experience apart from the logic of the foundational myth.I propose we treat born this way rhetoric as a meaningful and important mythological foundation for many LGBTQ communities, while also remaining critical of its tendency to become a dogmatic and totalizing discourse. Born this way thinking is an unproven and unprovable certainty. We do not know why people have different sexual orientations and gender identities. It is a... (shrink)

A reading of Kant as a theological rationalist may cohere with some Mu’tazilite views of morality, but is alien to mainstream Sunnism. Those who seek to engage Muslims would be well-advised to recall that they hold to a law-oriented ethics based in revelation, not on what reason might discover as compatible with God’s mind.

The growth in Muslim chaplaincy provision in UK prisons disguises a paucity of resources, particularly in the area of offender rehabilitation. Islam’s distinctive approach to antisocial behaviour, repentance and forgiveness needs to be better known among social administrators, particularly in the probation service.

Tim Stuart-Buttle offers a fresh view of British moral philosophy in the 17th and early 18th centuries. In this period of remarkable innovation, philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Hume combined critique of the role of Christianity in moral thought with reconsideration of the legacy of the classical tradition of academic scepticism.

With Numinous Seditions, celebrated poet and essayist Tim Lilburn investigates inner dispositions that might help us bear the new sorrows of the climate crisis. The book draws from the West’s almost forgotten contemplative tradition in its Platonic, Islamic, Christian, and Zoharic forms. It also explores ideas from modern philosophers Jan Zwicky, Gillian Rose, Dorothy Day, and Simone Weil, and from contemporary poets Don Domanski, Philip Kevin Paul, Anne Szumigalski, and Roberto Harrison. Lilburn suggests that listening, noticing, reading, and stretching (...) our imaginations are all part of an interior stance that can assist with the difficult tasks of forming deep relationships with the land, with Indigenous peoples, and with pedagogy itself. Numinous Seditions is for scholars and readers interested in poetry, environmental philosophy, and in the possibility of a contemplative politics. (shrink)

Transformational development is a concept of change that originated in the Christian context but has now become generally used in the work of both secular and faith-based organizations. The growing use of the concept by organizations that are fundamentally different has naturally led to some confusion about what the concept means and what it takes to effectively implement it. In this article, we describe the key features of the concept and how they are important in determining the organizational requirements (...) for its effective implementation. Drawing on a few cases, the paper highlights the centrality of faith in transformational development work. (shrink)

Locke refrained from engaging explicitly with Hobbes in any of his writings. Locke’s policy of non-engagement should be interpreted, we argue, neither as evidence of his lack of interest in (or ignorance of) Hobbes’s arguments, nor as an attempt to conceal from the uninitiated Locke’s covert Hobbesian commitments. Locke’s silence reveals rather than conceals. What it reveals is an absolute determination to “distinguish between the business of civil government and that of religion, and to mark the true bounds between them”. (...) Approached in this way, precisely because Locke’s account of the “business of civil government” says nothing about ecclesiastical government, the second of Two Treatises can be read, in its entirety, as a powerful critical response to Hobbes. To see why, it is necessary to grasp that Part iii of Leviathan (“Of a Christian Common-wealth”) is integral to Hobbes’s positive argumentative purposes in the work. (shrink)